Name: Public defence: Tete Kobla Agbota
Start: 2019-04-25
End: 2019-04-25

Trial lecture title: A behavior economics perspective on corruption.

Th ordinary opponents are:

First opponent: Professor Em. M. Jackson Marr, Georgia Institute of Technology, School of Psychology, USA
Second opponent: Professor Linda Hayes, Department of Psychology 1664 N Virginia Street, Reno, Nevada, USA
Leader of the evaluation committee: Professor II Bent Erik Bakken, Oslo Metropolitan University, Norway

The leader of the public defence is Professor Einar Strumse, Oslo Metropolitan University.

The main supervisor is Professor Ingunn Sandaker, Oslo Metropolitan University. The co-supervisor is Associate Professor Knut Boge, Oslo Metropolitan University.

Thesis abstract

Despite several policy measures endorsed to combat corruption, it remains one of the "wicked" problems of public administration in the 21st century.

Regardless of the enormous body of literature on corruption, some scholars indicate that current corruption literature lacks a contingency analysis. Moreover, there is dearth of behaviour analytic literature on corruption.

Using data based on self-reports and some conceptual tools of behaviour analysis, the three articles of this dissertation seek to answer two questions:

What behavioural processes accompany corrupt practices during a public officer-citizen interface?
How can the persistence of petty corruption in Ghana be explained?

Article I, II and III

Article I, a theoretical paper, exemplifies the usage of behaviour analytic conceptual tools to explain corruption.

Article II examines the metaphors of corruption language bribers, and bribees use when soliciting or offering bribes.

Lastly, Article III investigates the experiences of citizens during their encounters with corrupt public officers in general and the police in particular.

Contributions

This dissertation helps in the creation of a behaviour analytic space in corruption research with the following contributions:

First, it provides a definition and an accompanying behavioural explanatory model, based on the principle of selection by consequences, a model that challenges theories attributing corruption to personality traits.

Second, using the technical construct of metacontingency, a definition and three explanatory models are provided to enhance our understanding of corruption as a social behaviour. Corruption cases are often characterised by

non-linear behaviours
complex sets of concurrent contingencies
complex social environments.

The metacontingency conceptual tool may enable us to adequately account for the complexity associated with corruption involving groups of individuals. It may also augment the principal-agent theory.

Third, an orchard or a barrel of rotten apples theory is complemented with the construct of macrocontingency. Behaviour analysts are admonished to devote some of their attention to corruption research.